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Abstract:  
 
This paper examines the relationship between Australian-based agribusiness and the increasingly 
important markets of Asia. It assesses the merits of Australian government policy in general and toward 
the food sector in particular. It is suggested that Australian policymakers' faith in the ability of market 
forces to organize the domestic agribusiness sector so that  'Australian' interests might be advantaged is 
misplaced. More fundamentally, public policy in Australia fails to take account of the structure of 
international food production or the way corporate activities are organized in Asia. This case study sheds 
light on a number of important issues that have a salience beyond the Australian case. In particular, this 
paper raises questions about the public policy frameworks and theoretical models that characterize Anglo-
American approaches to engaging with Asia, and suggests that they generally continue to pay inadequate 
attention to the specificity of Asian production structures, business strategies or national policies. 
 
 
By world historical standards, Australia is a fortunate place. Blessed by natural resource wealth, and with 
a comparatively well-educated, wealthy and  peaceful population,  it has much to be thankful for. 
Australia’s position adjacent to the dynamic East Asian region might be expected to assure both its 
economic future and the maintenance of its attractive political and social traditions.  Yet Australian policy 
makers face the sorts of difficulties when dealing with ‘Asia’ that confront all governments from the 
Anglo-American economies. The preferred path of market-driven economic development and integration 
that characterizes government policy in North America, Britain and the Australasian nations may be 
placing these countries and the local firms within them at a serious competitive disadvantage. 
 
In this paper we shall examine the efficacy of recent Australian government economic policy. In 
particular, we shall consider the impact of the Australian government’s predominantly market-oriented 
reform process on the Australian-based  agribusiness sector. It will be suggested that successive  
Australian governments’ reliance on market forces to restructure ‘Australian’ business so that it may more 
effectively take advantage of its proximity to Asia has been at best overly optimistic, and at worst  naive. 
The agribusiness sector in particular and the Australian case in general stand as important exemplars of 
issues with widespread relevance and significance. This case study sheds light on  several  of the more 
important questions in the contemporary and increasingly internationalized world economy: Does 
nationality continue to matter? What happens when distinctively different national corporate and policy 
models interact? Are there characteristics of specific industrial sectors - in this case agribusiness - that are 
not captured in policy and analysis that draws its principal inspiration from orthodox economics? 
 
In the first part of the paper we briefly review contemporary Australian economic policy, paying 
particular attention to initiatives designed to promote the food sector. Following this, we outline the most 
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important features of Australian-based agribusiness, especially its ownership structure and links to the 
East Asian region. The very different rationale that informs Japanese and Chinese variants of capitalism 
and their relationship with government will be detailed. Finally, we consider some of the theoretical and 
policy implications that flow from our case study. 
 
Economic Policy in Australia 
 
Australia belongs to that group of predominantly Western nations that, at least at the level of rhetoric, 
consider markets to be more appropriate determinants of economic outcomes than states. Australia is 
further distinguished amongst the Anglo-American economies by having taken the process of market-
oriented reform further than most of its peers. Indeed, over the last twenty years or so the so-called 
‘Washington Consensus’ that advocates deregulation, trade liberalization, a smaller public sector, and a 
generally reduced role for government has become the unchallenged, conventional wisdom amongst  
Australia’s policy making elite. Australia, therefore, is an especially useful case study with which to judge 
the efficacy of this highly influential policy framework - especially given Australia’s proximity to an 
increasingly important region where the state continues to play a more interventionist role in national 
economic activity (Apellbaum and Henderson 1992: passim). 
 
Since the early 1980s, successive Australian  governments have embarked on a process of economic 
reform designed to transform the domestic economy and promote closer  ‘engagement’ - particularly 
economic -  with Australia’s Asian neighbors. A series of highly influential, government-sponsored policy 
documents have informed these initiatives, both for Australia’s external economic relations, where the 
logic of market-driven comparative advantage has been  considered the most appropriate basis for 
outward  re-orientation (Garnaut 1990), and in the domestic arena (Hilmer 1993), where an integrated 
process of micro-economic reform and enhanced competitiveness is  seen as the key to transforming 
Australia’s position in the region. Of late, Australian policy makers have attempted to export the 
economic logic that underpins the  domestic reform process to the international arena, where  Australia 
has championed an ambitious agenda of multilateral trade liberalization through trans-national 
institutional fora like the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping. However, while this may 
represent an overdue recognition of geographical reality, there are substantial grounds for questioning 
whether such initiatives are likely to lead to the sorts of wide spread trade liberalization that Australian 
policy makers hope (Beeson 1996a). 
 
Yet despite the existence of notable economic and political obstacles to the untrammeled operation of 
market forces within the region (Beeson 1996b), Australian policy is predicated, first and foremost, on the 
orthodoxies of neoclassical economics. According to  this logic, countries like Australia should obey the 
‘law’ of comparative advantage and specialize in those activities in which they enjoy a ‘natural’ 
advantage. Without wanting to deal exhaustively with arguments about the merits of states versus 
markets, a few simple points may be made. Firstly, the ascendancy of neoclassical thought in Australia 
has meant that policy makers have systematically ignored the manner in which their Asian neighbors have 
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actively attempted to create comparative advantages in sophisticated manufactured goods in which they 
appeared to have no ‘natural’ advantage (Matthews and Ravenhill 1996). Secondly, in the all too likely 
event that market forces do not become the sole or most powerful determinant of regional economic 
activity, Australia may continue to adhere to a strategy that is simply inappropriate. 
 
The recent election of a coalition Liberal-National Party in government  in Australia after thirteen years of 
Australian Labor Party rule seems likely to entrench the reliance on market forces in Australia. The new 
government’s ‘Supermarket to Asia’ strategy, while specifically designed to assist the agribusiness sector 
is, according to its Executive Director,  predicated upon the assumption that  removing export barriers and 
developing a more aggressive export culture will transform ‘Australia’s’ position (Bourke 1997). We 
shall suggest in what follows, however, that while the new government’s strategy represents a welcome 
recognition of the importance of both the region in general and the agribusiness sector in particular,  it 
pays inadequate attention to the constraints imposed by ownership and production patterns throughout the 
region. Australia’s agribusiness sector, therefore, provides a particularly useful illustration of the sorts of 
issues with which policy makers and scholars alike must grapple. 
 
Agribusiness in Australia   
 
Although rural and mineral wealth have been important contributors to Australia’s economic 
development,  structural changes in an increasingly influential external economic environment have 
meant that these industries are no longer the unqualified boons they once were. Peter Drucker  (1986) has 
drawn attention to the profound structural transformation that has occurred within the international 
economy as the primary products economy has become ‘uncoupled’ from the industrial economy. The 
prices paid for raw materials and industrial products in world markets have been moving in opposite 
directions. Resource dependent countries like Australia find themselves having to achieve greater 
quantities of commodity exports simply to  pay for the same amount of manufactured  imports. The 
development of  domestic agribusiness – or the industrialization, and systematic value-adding  to food 
production and distribution – might allow Australian policy makers to address what are becoming 
increasingly serious and intractable problems. 
 
The global decline in the value of  agricultural products in particular has meant that Australia has 
confronted a steadily deteriorating balance of trade. Even a ‘mineral boom’ in the early 1970s failed to 
halt this steady post-war  decline. Moreover, a general reliance on commodity exports has left Australia 
vulnerable to rapid,  uncontrollable, externally-generated changes in its terms of trade, placing pressure on 
its currency and making the long-term management of the economy increasingly problematic (Bell 1997: 
ch. 4). In short, there are compelling incentives for Australian policy makers to try and diversify the 
nation’s economic profile, especially in manufactured goods, which are generally less volatile, more 
valuable, and likely to generate greater numbers of jobs. The logic of comparative advantage would 
suggest that Australia should be well placed to develop a presence in global agribusiness, rather than 
simply exporting unprocessed agricultural products. Clearly, these secondary value-adding processes 
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offer an important opportunity for Australian-based businesses to establish a major presence in an 
increasingly important manufacturing industry. 
 
But before considering how successful Australian policy makers efforts to establish such a presence have 
been, we should  make clear just how important the agricultural sector remains in Australia.  The food and 
beverage industries that transform basic agricultural products and add value to raw materials constitute the 
largest element of Australia’s manufacturing sector, contributing more than a fifth of total manufacturing 
turnover in Australia, or in excess of  $A 35 billion in 1992-93 (DIST 1995:9). Moreover, the processed 
food and beverage producers directly employed more than 150,000 people, or nearly 20 per cent of total 
manufacturing employment. More importantly, perhaps, Australia’s food and beverage sector was one of 
the few manufacturing industries to achieve an export surplus, contributing approximately $A 13 billion 
to national income in 1994-95.  
 
These figures are especially significant when considered in the light of Australia’s overall economic 
position. Since Australia initiated a process of tariff reduction, trade liberalization and reduced 
government assistance to industry - in line with the overarching logic of its market-oriented economic 
policy framework -  there has been a dramatic decline in the position of Australia’s manufacturing sector 
and the jobs it supports. Australia’s overall deficit in manufactured goods has grown dramatically, despite 
an increase in overall manufactured exports.  Since the mid-1980s, Australia has lost some 400,000 
manufacturing jobs and seen its manufacturing trade deficit expand to $42 billion (The Age, 3 March, 
1996:2). Clearly, then, the success of Australian agribusiness is an important test of the efficacy of 
Australian government policy in general and market-oriented, comparative advantage theory in particular. 
Moreover, it is an important generalized test of the Anglo-American approach to economic management. 
 
Government Policy and the Asian Market 
 
Before considering the specific agribusiness policies that successive governments in Australia put  in 
place, it is worth emphasizing how potentially important the Asian market is  for Australian-based 
agribusiness. The ‘Asian food market’ (1), was valued at US$617 billion per annum  in 1991. Of 
Australia’s ten largest export markets – in order of importance, Japan, the US, Taiwan, New Zealand, 
Hong Kong, the UK, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia – seven are in Asia (BIE 
1996: 25). Regional  demographics and rapidly increasing per capita incomes suggest that this market 
may be worth somewhere between US$160 billion (PMSEC 1994:30) and US$ 450 billion (The 
Economist, 4 December, 1993: 15)  per year by the year 2000. The Japanese market for imported food is, 
at US$31.5 billion, worth more than the entire Australian domestic market (US$27 billion).  
 
Clearly, were Australia able to simply maintain its share of this burgeoning market, it would go some way 
to remedying the otherwise  intractable balance of payments problem. Given the proximity of Asia,  
Australia’s comparative advantage in rural industries, and changes in regional food consumption patterns 
(2), it might be expected that this would be a relatively simple task.  However, despite the East  Asian 
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region’s share of world imports having jumped from 16 per cent in 1985 to 24 per cent in 1994, 
Australia’s share of  the region’s overall imports has fallen from 4.1 per cent in 1985 to 2.6 per cent in 
1995 (Drysdale & Weiguo Lu 1996). More significantly for the purposes of this paper, agri-food exports 
to the Asian region have shown only minimal growth, from A$ 4.2 billion in 1988/89 to A$4.7 billion in 
1992/93 (PMSEC 1994: 8), even though the region’s food market has been rapidly expanding. Indeed, 
agribusiness exports have performed poorly compared to growth in other manufacturing industries (BIE 
1996:28). 
 
 Despite being adjacent to the most dynamic and rapidly growing area of the global economy, then, 
Australian policy makers  have been unable to maintain Australia’s position, let alone take advantage of 
it. To their credit, the former Labor governments of Prime Ministers Bob Hawke and Paul Keating were 
keenly aware of Australia’s declining position within the region and of the necessity of trying to do 
something about it. What is more debatable is whether their favored mechanism for transforming 
‘Australia’s’ position – market forces – was appropriate. While there were occasional  half-hearted, but 
surprisingly effective, attempts at developing specific industry policies (Sheehan et al 1994), the overall 
approach to economic policy in general and the Asian region in particular was established by the neo-
classically oriented  Garnaut (1990) Report. The logic of this market driven approach informed 
subsequent specific initiatives toward the agribusiness sector. 
 
In 1992, under  the then Labor government, a specific policy framework for the agribusiness sector was 
developed. An Agri-Food Council was established to oversee and develop  policies for the industry. The 
major recommendations of its inaugural, especially commissioned report are revealing. Significantly, the 
Council’s first suggestion is that government implement the ‘Hilmer (1993) Report’ and make 
competition, or more specifically, market forces, the primary mechanism with which to  restructure the 
food industry  (PMSEC 1994: ix). In tandem with enhanced competition, the Council suggests that 
accelerating workplace reform and ensuring market access are the best means of promoting agribusiness 
and increasing exports from Australia. One of the most telling analytical shortcomings of the Council’s 
report, however,  is its approach to the question of nationality. In this regard, the report is emblematic of a 
common failure on the part of Australian policy makers in particular and those of the Anglo American 
economies more generally: despite a rhetorical concern with questions of ‘national interest’ there is 
remarkably little understanding of the significance of nationality at the level of the firm or its impact on 
the  organization of trans-regional production patterns.  
 
Several  important points may be made in this regard. Firstly, in an era of trans-national corporations 
(TNCs) the entire notion of nationality has become inherently problematic. This is not to suggest that 
there is a process of ‘convergence’ occurring, or that companies driven by an  international operational 
logic are necessarily  becoming alike (Beeson 1996b). On the contrary, where  companies still display 
noteworthy differences and important national characteristics (Encarnation  & Mason 1994), this will be 
reflected in the operations of  subsidiaries in other countries. This inevitably problematises any 
conception of  ‘the national interest’, or ‘national industries’ for  host governments. The significance of 
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this point here is that analyses based on an undifferentiated notion of ‘Australian companies’, or strategies 
predicated upon making ‘Australian industry competitive’ (PMSEC 1994: 7), are unlikely to recognize, 
let alone construct policies to deal with, the manner in which contemporary production processes are 
organized across the East Asian region. 
 
To see why this question of nationality is particularly relevant in the Australian case, it is necessary to 
take a closer look at the organization of the food industry in Australia, and the increasingly trans-national 
logic that informs it. 
 
The Structure of Agri-Food Business in Australia 
 
The first thing that is immediately apparent from Table 1 is that the idea of an ‘Australian’ food industry 
is something of a misnomer. Less than half of the largest twenty food processing companies with 
Australian operations are actually ‘Australian’ (3). This high concentration of foreign ownership is typical 
of the wider Australian economy,  which has one of the highest levels of foreign ownership in the world 
(Safarian 1993), a factor which has two particularly important implications in the food industry. First, the 
logic that informs production may be a trans-national one. In other words, production in Australia may be 
aimed principally at the small, but lucrative domestic market rather than at exports.  Furthermore, the 
higher value-added aspects of production – like research and development (R&D) -  may be conducted in 
the TNC’s host country, rather than in Australia. Significantly, the level of R&D undertaken in the food 
sector is less than the average for the manufacturing sector (BIE 1996: 21), which is itself low compared 
to the that of many Asian countries. Even related service industries, like advertising, may be affected as 
campaigns are developed for global products. The second major impact of such high concentrations of 
foreign ownership is, of course, that profits are inevitably repatriated  to the TNCs home country, rather 
than remaining in Australia for possible re-investment. 
 
Table 1  
Major Food and Beverage Companies in Australia, 1994-95 
 
Company Australian 
turnover 
Export 
earnings 
Ownership 
 
Coca-Cola Amatil 
Goodman Fielder 
Nestle 
Carlton & United Breweries 
Lion Nathan Australia 
Pacific Brands Food Group 
George Weston Foods 
National Foods 
Bonlac Foods 
Cadbury Schweppes 
Ingham’s Enterprises 
Murray Goulburn Co-op. Co. 
$m 
2,239 
2,100 
1,700 
1,572 
1,288 
1,064 
1,038 
1,027 
991 
909 
825 
805 
$m 
Nil 
121 
250 
50 
10 
na 
15 
29 
427 
28 
na 
485 
 
Aus. (60%); US (40%) 
Aus. (75%);  NZ (20%) 
Switzerland 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Various 
UK (78%); Aus. (22%) 
Australia 
Australia 
UK 
Australia 
Australia 
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Unifoods 
Effern Foods 
Australian Co-operative Foods 
Kraft Foods 
QUF Industries 
Arnotts Biscuits 
CSR 
Kellogs 
700+ 
692 
625 
583 
561 
546 
425 
390
22 
147 
25 
92 
na 
23 
600 
50
UK/Holland 
US 
Australia 
US 
Australia 
US (61%); Aus (29%) 
Australia 
US 
Source: BIE (1996:12) 
 
 
It is important to recognize that the ownership of businesses  in the food sector and the consequent 
corporate strategies that companies have employed has been directly affected by Australian  government 
policies, particularly the liberalization and deregulation of the economy in the 1980s. While the adoption 
of market-oriented, neoliberal policies was clearly not something that was exclusive to Australia, it had a 
profound impact on the domestic economy and thus stands as an important measure of the effectiveness 
of government policy. One of the most significant long-term outcomes generated by  a banking sector that 
was increasingly exposed to foreign competition was a reckless pursuit of market share and corporate 
clients. Robert Fagan (1996) has detailed the impact that the restructuring of the financial sector had on 
the ‘real’ economy in general and the food industry’s links with Asia  in particular. The sudden 
availability of massive quantities of capital to ‘corporate raiders’ meant that the food industry quickly 
became the target of takeover activity designed to ensure control of the cash flows that industries like 
brewing provide. Companies like Elders IXL Ltd, and the Bond Corporation were major players in the 
wave of take-over activity  that gripped Australia in the late 1980s. Significantly, neither company 
survives, and  many of their erstwhile assets are now foreign-owned. Alan Bond is currently in jail for a 
variety of offenses related to this period. 
 
The more lasting impact of the deregulatory era has been a further diminution of (ostensibly) Australian 
ownership and control of local industry (4). This is especially significant in an Australian context for 
several reasons. Firstly, Australia’s potential as a source of manufactured exports has been constrained 
historically by the predominant structure of Australian-based companies. Nominally Australian firms 
have tended to be  ‘multi-domestics’, their major products effectively determining the way in which they 
achieve international sales and expansion. Less traded  goods like building products and beverages are 
more economically produced within  target markets, rather than being exported from Australia (Craig & 
Yetton 1994). While this form of expansion may not generate the  high levels of manufactured exports 
that Australian policy makers might wish, there is evidence that a multi-domestic strategy and the 
investment associated with it does promote trade and  is therefore potentially beneficial. However, 
government research has shown that  even this limited form of export-oriented activity and the investment 
it generates will be reduced where the industry sector is dominated by foreign-owned companies and the 
Australian branches merely operate as subsidiaries (EAAU 1994b: 6).   
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One of the most insurmountable obstacles for  Australia’s Asian engagement policy has been the 
comparatively low levels of investment in Asia: the UK and the US remain the overwhelming focus of 
Australian foreign direct investment (FDI)  (BIE 1995: 58). The low levels of FDI from Australia mean 
that few backward or  forward  linkages are established between Australian and Asian based economic 
entities (EAAU 1994b:5), a problem compounded by the vertically integrated nature of Asian business 
structures detailed below. Moreover, the government’s non-interventionist strategy of restructuring 
through increased  competitive pressures appears unlikely to remedy these inter-connected difficulties.  
 
The takeover of Arnotts Biscuits by the US-based Campbell group was approved by the Australian 
government on the grounds that Campbell’s may be capable of not only injecting some much-needed 
strategic skills, but help Arnotts overcome another major constraint on the outward expansion of 
Australian-based companies: the limited size of ‘Australian’ firms. While there are substantial grounds for 
thinking that the comparatively small scale of Australian-based production has been a factor in restricting 
export growth and outward foreign investment from Australia (Pappas et al 1990), a strategy of relying on 
foreign multinationals to achieve this appears not to have worked in the Arnotts case. Arnotts has failed to 
increase its domestic market share or establish an Asian presence - the dominant rationale espoused by 
government when approving such a high profile ‘Australian’ company’s takeover  (The Australian, 30 
January, 1996:61).  
 
A consideration of the specific historical experiences of individual companies within the food sector 
reinforces one of  Fagan’s (1996) most important insights: there are a range of possible strategies 
available to companies which reflect and determine  the way they are integrated into international and 
domestic production networks. Moreover, the possibilities open to different companies will be facilitated 
or constrained by the broader national institutional framework within which individual firms are 
embedded. The importance of both these observations is borne out by the experience of  the Pacific 
Dunlop food group, which seemed an indigenous company capable of   developing  a serious Asia 
strategy. Pacific Dunlop’s Asian export and investment ambitions were precisely the sort of corporate 
initiative government strategy had been designed to promote. However, unlike the more ‘patient’ 
investors found in many Asian business systems,  institutional stock market investors in Australia were  
not prepared to allow sufficient time for  the long-term nature of this strategy to unfold (The Australian, 5 
February, 1993:17). Consequently, Pacific Dunlop sold off its food divisions to the more powerful, capital 
rich Nestle Corporation and the J.R. Simplot Corporation of the US. Furthermore, as Pritchard (1995: 43) 
points out, Pacific Dunlop’s food divisions had an additional quality over and above their long-term 
potential profitability: foreign companies were keen to secure the iconic brand names that offered a 
critically important marketing advantage in Australia. 
 
There are, therefore,  significant constraints imposed by the nature of production and  ownership patterns 
in Australia, and the sorts of links these generate with the wider region. To see why these links are 
important and how useful the Australian government’s policies are in relation to the food sector it is 
necessary to examine the organization of food production and distribution throughout the region. 
 9
 
Regional Food Production and Distribution 
 
The first thing to recognize about agribusiness is that, like defense industries, food has a significance that 
transcends its immediate commercial position. In many of the countries of  the East and Southeast region, 
food self-sufficiency has been a central goal of economic development (EAAU 1994a). As a 
consequence, the management of the food sector has been a primary area of governmental concern, 
spawning highly ‘interventionist’ and protectionist policies as a result. Even in those more affluent Asian 
countries, like Japan, which would seem to have little problem in financing any amount of food imports, 
food security remains an enduring concern of government, and an object of bureaucratic intervention 
(Nikkei Weekly,10 February, 1997:3). Moreover, what  more abstract, predominantly economic analyses - 
of the sort undertaken by the Australian government - fail to recognize or take account of is that national 
policies toward food may be determined by powerful domestic political forces. The highly influential rice 
lobby, for example, has made any penetration of the Japanese market extremely difficult for would-be 
foreign suppliers, a situation that looks unlikely to change, despite Japan’s supposed APEC commitments 
(McCormack 1996; Beeson 1996a). 
 
As serious as these political constraints are, what is of equal significance is the manner in which 
production is organized across the region and the sorts of corporate logic that informs such activities.  
Japan, or more accurately, the TNCs  which are based there, are once again highly significant actors in 
this regard. Beeson (forthcoming) has undertaken a detailed examination of the operation, structure and 
impact of Japan’s keiretsu networks on Australia, which will not be repeated here. Suffice to say, that 
Japan’s vertically and horizontally integrated keiretsu business structures offer important opportunities for 
organizing and controlling the production and distribution of commodities that are not generally possible 
for their ‘stand alone’ Western rivals. In particular, the trading companies (sogo shosha), which are such a 
critical part of keiretsu operations, facilitate the control of foreign trade and production through strategic 
investments, trade mediation, and their unrivaled intelligence gathering capacity. Significantly, this sort of 
nationally specific corporate organization is not even recognized, let alone responded to, in the economic 
theory and policy of many Western governments like Australia’s. 
 
The potential impact of these corporate structures in the agribusiness sector, and their intersection with 
influential political forces in Japan,  may be illustrated in ‘Australia’s’ beef industry. Two points are 
noteworthy here. Firstly, the  Japanese government has shown great reluctance to open up its domestic 
market to foreign competition – something that reflects the continuing influence of the domestic rural 
lobby. Secondly, where limited opening has occurred, it has been accompanied by a rapid build-up of 
investment  by Japanese companies in Australia. The motivation here is not difficult to fathom: if the 
continued liberalization of Japan’s  farm sector is going to occur, Japanese TNCs are moving quickly to 
ensure that they control it. In the wake of increased beef exports to Japan,  Japanese companies have 
moved to secure control of supply and distribution by investing in land, feed-lots, abattoirs and meat 
processing works in Australia (Morison 1993; MRC 1997). The net result of this process has been that 
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Japanese companies now control  beef production from the farm gate to the supermarket shelf. 
Consequently, profits from this increasingly lucrative business are being transferred  up the value chain, 
something  that contributes significantly to the massive loss of tax revenues to multinationals in Australia 
(Australian Financial Review, 10 October, 1994: 2; Sydney Morning Herald, 28 October, 1996: 2).  
Japanese companies realize super-profits in Japan where returns are inflated through a combination of 
notoriously high Japanese consumer prices and systematically depressed returns to Australian livestock 
producers (Fowler 1996).  
 
Although meat production is at the ‘minimally processed’ end of the value-adding spectrum, it should be 
noted that it is Australia’s  largest single manufactured food product and worth A$ 4,462 million in 1994-
95 (BIE 1996: 26). Clearly, even relatively small increases in rates of profitability in this industry would 
have a significant impact on Australia’s balance of payments and the viability of the depressed rural 
sector. As we shall see below, the  problems of ‘Australian’ exporters  are compounded by the corporate 
structures of domestic industries and Japan’s notorious distribution system, leaving them reliant on the 
sogo shosha to manage exports into Japan, with consequent  losses of income and control. Significant 
numbers of potential exporters from Australia do not even attempt to establish an export presence in 
Japan. When combined with the US’s aggressive, results-based  bilateral trade strategy, which has 
succeeded in winning greater market share in Japan, this export diffidence and lack of control helps 
explain Australian exporters’ decreasing share of what is still their most important export market 
(Riethmuller & Tsuchiya 1994). Moreover, it  should be noted that Japanese transnationals structural 
dominance and control of exports form Australia is not confined to the food sector, but extends across the  
resource sector, and is especially noteworthy in Australia’s largest single physical export – coal (Beeson 
1995). 
 
However, it is not only Japan’s corporate structures and business practices that have presented formidable 
challenges to Australian policymakers and domestic business. Increasingly, a Chinese variety of 
capitalism is exerting a powerful influence on the structure of the region’s food industry (5). One of the 
most important qualities that distinguishes Asian business generally in the agri-food sector is that the 
companies are generally part of conglomerates (RIRDC 1995: 29). Unlike their typical Western 
counterparts, these Asian conglomerates are generally not focused on a ‘core business’, nor constrained 
by the sorts of shareholder pressures that have, as we have seen, caused such difficulties for TNCs that 
originate in Australia. Moreover, the development of a conglomerate form of business enterprise 
‘follow[s] naturally in Asia as a consequence of the close government/business relationships, ethnic and 
cultural factors, and the financial system structure which is predominantly credit, rather than capital 
market based’ (RIRDC 1995: 30). In other words, there are specific, contingent institutional forms and 
practices which influence the structure of economic relationships in the region in general, and in the food 
sector in particular. Importantly, the logic upon which these relationships are predicated  and the manner 
in which they are conducted – particularly with regard to the role of government and the importance of 
networks (either Japan’s corporate keiretsu or the more personally-based Chinese  guanxi  variety) – is 
generally the antithesis of the idealized conception of the firm that informs Australian government policy. 
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An important example of the distinctive and successful pattern of  Chinese-style capitalism is the CP 
Group, based in Thailand. Originally a domestically-oriented agribusiness, the CP group has now grown 
into a conglomerate encompassing some 250 companies spread across 20 countries, with diversified 
interests in  telecoms, semiconductors and media (Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 January, 1997: 38-
45). Agri-business is still the CP Group’s core activity, however, and it remains a tightly integrated, 
vertically organized corporate structure that allows control of the industry from the network of contract 
farms that provide the raw materials, through the processing and distribution networks, to franchised retail 
outlets (EAAU 1995: 323-25). CP’s executive director, Dhanin Chearavanont, has used his Chinese 
ethnicity and concomitant guanxi to  establish a major presence in China’s expanding market. Not only 
does the CP Group’s size, connections, and ‘insider’ status make continued successful expansion within 
Asia more likely, but their tight control of regional production and distribution networks makes it  harder 
for outsiders to establish a competing presence. 
 
The impact of these distinctive economic relationships  is apparent at both the immediate level of 
commercial practice, and in national and trans-national political relations. Importantly, these elements are 
not distinct and unrelated, as orthodox Western economic theory might suggest, but inter-linked and 
mutually reinforcing. The desire to vertically integrate all aspects of an industry which characterizes the 
Asian conglomerates’ approach,  is actively supported and promoted by sympathetic and cooperative 
governments unconstrained by Western concerns with oligopolization and diminished competition. On 
the contrary, the themes of economic development, food security and corporate growth lead to a mutually 
rewarding symbiosis which has allowed Asian conglomerates to assume dominant positions within the 
region’s production and distribution systems.  
 
This confluence of practices leads to a situation in which the conglomerates dominate not only  
production, but also the important  distribution process, through highly complex, personalized and labor 
intensive networks. In such a situation would-be competitors either become dependent on Asian 
distributors, or must attempt to establish their own presence within target markets. Clearly, this latter 
strategy is something that only large scale players can hope to attempt. As we have seen, the ownership 
structure and manner in which  the food industry in Australia is integrated into the  wider external 
economic environment  suggest that its position will generally remain marginal and dependent. Even size 
and local ownership are no guarantee of success in Asia: Goodman Fielder, the largest Australian-owned 
food manufacturer, has scaled down its Asian operations in favour of a greater concentration on the 
domestic market (Australian Financial Review, 21 June 1996: 45). An inability to establish brand names, 
and unsuccessful promotional campaigns for ‘Australian’ produce in Asia suggest that there is a deep-
seated failing on the part of local management to comprehend  Asian markets or business practices (The 
Australian 28 February, 1994: 4 & 3 November, 1995: 23; Australian Financial Review 3 March, 1997: 
1). 
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The future of the food industry in Australia, therefore,  raises complex and important  issues that go 
beyond the narrowly economic. This case study is emblematic of wider concerns that are central to 
‘Australia’s’ future relationship with ‘Asia’. An initial step in defining this relationship will be the 
development within Australia of a more sophisticated understanding of both the organization of economic 
activity within the region and of the region itself. If Australia is to transform its  peripheral and dependent 
position at both the economic and political levels within the region, it is essential that Australia’s political 
and business elites become more ‘Asia literate’ (Fitzgereald 1997). Indeed, it may  be necessary for 
Australians to consider emulating the sorts of industry policies that have played such a critical role in 
allowing some of Australia’s Asian neighbors  to develop dominant positions in industries in which they 
appear to have no ‘natural’ comparative advantage (6). In short, to overcome the sorts of structurally 
entrenched disadvantages that this case study has identified, there would seem little option for the 
Australian government other than to abandon its overwhelming  reliance on market forces and become 
more directly involved in determining the basis upon which business operates in Australia, be it ‘foreign’ 
or ‘Australian’ (7). 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Despite the potential importance that the more highly processed elements of the food production present, 
the position of the industry in Australia has generally not fulfilled the hopes of policy makers. A recent 
report concluded that recent government initiatives had ‘not had any significant impacts on industry 
performance’ (BIE 1996:xiv). Certainly, the domestic market remains highly profitable for some 
indigenous companies and multi-national subsidiaries, but this has not provided the basis for  large scale 
exports of highly processed goods to the burgeoning Asian markets. On the contrary, Australia has 
struggled to maintain its share of regional markets. 
 
What an examination of the specifics of the Australian-based food  industry and its links with Asia 
suggests is that the Australian government’s faith in the efficacy of market forces to restructure the local 
industry on a more favorable basis appears misplaced. The international food industry is dominated by a 
comparatively small number of companies that have advantages of scale and scope, factors which are not 
easily accounted for in orthodox Western economic analyses (8). Moreover, Asian governments have 
played an active role in encouraging the development of national firms that can  compete with the 
international majors. Through interventionist industry policies and protectionist measures, regional 
governments have attempted to promote  national producers at the expense of their foreign rivals.  
 
The Australian government, by contrast, has preferred to rely on market forces and the presumed benefits 
that may be derived from a predominantly domestically-oriented reform process. While competitive 
pressures may generate some efficiency gains, it is questionable whether such improvements will 
compensate for the constraints imposed by regional production structures. Until sufficiently large scale, 
externally-oriented firms develop in Australia it is unlikely that the country’s relatively marginal and 
subordinate position in the region will be altered. While the processed food industry remains almost 
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exclusively foreign-owned, a change in the role played by Australian-based subsidiaries seems  
improbable. The absence of  supportive industry polices,  a  lack of competitively priced capital, and the 
short-term outlook  that stock market pressures in Australia create, means that this situation is unlikely to 
be remedied in the foreseeable future. 
 
Endnotes 
1 Australian government reports tend to talk rather imprecisely about ‘the Asian food market’, but the 
predominant areas of interest are the growing markets of East and Southeast Asia. 
2  It should be noted that the popularly held view that Asian tastes in food are becoming rapidly 
Westernized is generally overstated. On the contrary, despite the success of some highly visible 
multinational retailers like McDonalds and the growth in sales of products like ice cream, Asian markets 
are still dominated by traditional food products like rice, fish and vegetables (RIRDC 1995: 8-19). 
3 Even this more limited conception of Australian nationality is subject to contestation as ownership 
structures are potentially affected by the internationalization of shareholders. See Reich (1991) for a fuller 
examination of this point. However,  conventional estimates suggest that up to 80 per cent of the food 
processing industry in Australia is foreign owned (The Australian, 31 January,1996:27). 
4 Extensive personal interviews conducted by  Cloney suggest that the few remaining Australian-owned 
dairy companies like Bonlac, which have been run as privately-owned co-operatives, are coming under 
increasing pressure to become publicly listed companies. The possibilities this opens up for a further 
diminution of local control of the industry are obvious. 
5 On the distinction between Japanese and Chinese varieties of capitalism, see Whitley (1991). 
6 For a consideration of successful Asian industry policies, see Wade (1990). For an innovative blueprint 
for Australia, see Sicklen (1993). 
7 There are a range of possible initiatives government might take in this regard, from more closely 
examining foreign investment and takeover activity to see if it is in the ‘national interest’, to encouraging 
the development of local industry through the provision of competitively priced capital. For example, 
building on the locally-owned, cooperatively-organized, regional dairy industry might be one way of 
trying to develop the economies of scale that might provide a springboard into Asian markets. 
8 For a more detailed consideration of the shortcomings of orthodox Western economic thought in 
relation to Asian varieties of capitalism, see Beeson (forthcoming). 
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